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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Manuel Garcia Velasco appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct
with a minor under the age of sixteen. He asserts that his Fifth Amendment rights were
violated when the district court used information contained in his competency evaluation
against him.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Velasco was charged with one count of lewd conduct with a minor under the
age of sixteen. (R., # 36094, p.16.) 1 Counsel for Mr. Velasco moved for, and the court
ordered, a competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 18-211. (R., # 36094, pp.22, 24.)
The evaluation found that Mr. Velasco was competent, and Mr. Velasco entered a plea
of not guilty.

(R., # 36094, p.28.)

Several months later, the court ordered another

competency evaluation after questioning Mr. Velasco about entering an Alford plea.
(R., # 36094, p.36.)

While this report found Mr. Velasco to be competent, the court

ordered Dr. Lindsey to recommend an aide or assistant to assist with Mr. Velasco and
his attorney during the change of plea process. (R., # 36094, pAO.) Dr. Christensen
was suggested as this assistant. (R., # 36094, pA2.)
Mr. Velasco subsequently entered an Alford plea. (R., # 36094, pA6.) The State
agreed to recommend probation if the psychosexual evaluation did not find him to be a
pedophile, a sexual predator, or a moderate to high risk to re-offend or have any
(R., # 36094, pA6.) Afterward, the court

previous felony convictions on his record.

indicated that it would do some research to determine whether Mr. Velasco's plea was

1

"knowing and voluntary." (R, # 36094, p.49.) The court subsequently entered an order
accepting Mr. Velasco's plea.

(R, # 36094, p.51.)

The court then ordered a

psychosexual evaluation. (R, # 36094, p.59.)
At sentencing, the district court imposed a unified sentence of thirty years, with
ten years fixed.
dismissed.

(R, # 36094, p.68.)

(R, p.8.)

Mr. Velasco appealed, but the appeal was

However, the district court granted post-conviction relief to

Mr. Velasco and re-entered the judgment of conviction. (R, p.16.) Mr. Velasco again
appealed. (R, p.20.) He asserts that the district court erred by using information in his
competency evaluations against him at sentencing. 2

1 The Idaho Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of the transcript and record in
docket number 39064, the prior appeal of this conviction that was dismissed.
2 Prior to the sentencing hearing, the district court inquired into a mental health
evaluation, stating, "I don't think ... that a 19-2524 evaluation is necessary given the
pretty comprehensive evaluations that we've had so far in this case." (Sent. Tr., p.54,
Ls.17-20.) Counsel for Mr. Velasco agreed. (Sent. Tr., p.54, L.21.) For this reason, Mr.
Velasco does not assert that the district court erred by failing to order a mental health
evaluation for sentencing.

2

ISSUE
Did the district court violate Mr. Velasco's Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination when it improperly used information obtained for purposes of determining
Mr. Velasco's competency at sentencing?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Violated Mr. Velasco's Fifth Amendment Privilege Against SelfIncrimination When It Improperly Used Information Obtained For Purposes Of
Determining Mr. Velasco's Competency At Sentencing

A.

Introduction
Mr. Velasco asserts that the district court improperly considered his statements,

and the medical conclusions based directly upon these statements, contained within his
competency evaluation for purposes of aggravation at sentencing.

B.

The District Court Violated Mr. Velasco's Fifth Amendment Privilege Against SelfIncrimination When It Improperly Used Information Obtained For Purposes Of
Determining Mr. Velasco's Competency At Sentencing
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that "No

person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
This safeguard against compelled self-incrimination applies to both the guilt and penalty
phases of a trial. Mitchell v. United States, 562 U.S. 314, 325-27 (1999); Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981); Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 563-64 (2006);
State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 871-72 (1989). A competency evaluation ordinarily
does not implicate the Fifth Amendment because any disclosures made by the
defendant are not used against him but are used only for the limited purpose of
determining whether he is competent to stand trial. See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 465. Fifth
Amendment rights come into play, however, if disclosures made during a competency
evaluation, or medical conclusions derived from such disclosures, are later used against
the defendant at either the guilt or penalty phase of the proceedings. Id. Consequently,
statements made by an accused during a competency evaluation and derivative
psychiatric opinions generally may not be admitted against the individual for sentencing
purposes unless the defendant was advised of the right against self-incrimination and
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waived those rights. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469; State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817,820
(Ct. App. 2010).
Additionally, the Idaho Court of Appeals has instructed, "[i]f in any district court of
this state it is a routine practice of the presentence investigator to attach copies of
competency evaluations to PSis, the practice should be discontinued."
148 Idaho at 823 n.1.

Jockumsen,

Further, where a medical diagnosis from a competency

evaluation is partly predicated on the statements of the defendant, that diagnosis should
likewise not be considered at sentencing. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. at 464.
Mr. Velasco acknowledges that he did not raise these concerns to the district
court. However, this claim may still be addressed pursuant to Idaho's fundamental error
doctrine. In order to establish fundamental error, Mr. Velasco must show
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). Mr. Velasco has established fundamental
error.

Regarding the first prong, as set forth above, this claim involves a Fifth

Amendment violation, an unwaived constitutional right.
Regarding the second prong, the error is clear from the record.

At the

sentencing hearing, the court inquired of defense counsel whether probation was
appropriate, "especially, where it appears that Dr. Lindsey, to some degree, really
pegged his neurocognitive function at the beginning where he figured that he was what was the term he used? Let's see if I can find it here. I want to say manipulating;
but I don't think that was the actual term used." (Sent. Tr., p.64, L.22 - p.65, L.3.)

5

When asked if the court was thinking about the prior competency evaluation, the court
stated, "yes." (Sent. Tr., p.65, Ls.5-6.) The court then expressed great concern about
the fact that Mr. Velasco had denied remembering the alleged incidents during the
competency evaluations but then admitted to the conduct during the psychosexual
evaluation. (Sent. Tr., p.65, Ls.16-25.)
The prosecutor then pointed out that in the March 10, 2008, competency
evaluation, that Dr. Lindsay opined that Mr. Velasco's responses suggested a
"malingered cognitive dysfunction." (Sent. Tr., p.67, Ls.5-10.) The prosecutor believed,
"that's kind of what the Court was referring to earlier." (Sent. Tr., p.67, Ls.12-20.)
When the court was imposing sentence it stated, "the other thing that was of
concern of Dr. Lindsey and a concern of this Court, as we've discussed, is that given
your neurocognitive functioning, you tend to play upon that and exaggerate that deficit
to more than what it really is, which may have a bearing on how treatable you are."
(Sent. Tr., p.71, Ls.6-12.) The court remarked that, "I questioned that you were able to
admit to a lot of the factual things on that evening, but couldn't remember what actually
happened between you and her."

(Sent. Tr., p.72, Ls.13-17.)

The court ultimately

concluded that Mr. Velasco finally admitted to the conduct during the psychosexual
evaluation because, "you basically knew, based upon that deception, that you weren't
going to get around that anymore and came to your senses." (Sent. Tr., p.72, LS.1722.)
Again, the district court referenced Dr. Lindsey's psychosexual evaluation, stating
that, "on Page 2, is that we still have some concerns about the nature and severity and
extent of your cognitive abilities because you didn't put forth a consistent and adequate
effort on those testing procedures."

(Sent. Tr., p.77, Ls.1-5.)

6

The psychosexual

evaluation referenced the prior competency evaluations, including the conclusion that
Mr. Velasco was exaggerating his condition.

(Psychosexual Evaluation.)

The court

therefore concluded that Mr. Velasco did indeed remember the events of the incident at
hand despite "your times here in court and initially with Dr. Lindsey" when he denied
remembering what had happened. (Sent. Tr., p.77, Ls.6-12.) It is clear from the record
that the district court was using information contained the competency evaluations
against Mr. Velasco.
Regarding the third prong, the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. As
set forth above, the record demonstrates that the court, over and over again, referenced
the fact that Dr. Lindsey believed that Mr. Velasco was malingering, and repeatedly
stated that it believed that Mr. Velasco had always remembered the incidents at hand,
despite reporting otherwise to Dr. Lindsey. These conclusions clearly played a role the
court's sentence and, therefore, Mr. Velasco has established that the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings.
The district court considered both the competency evaluations directly, and the
references to them in the psychosexual evaluation. This was improper, because, as set
forth above, statements made by an accused during a competency evaluation and
derivative psychiatric opinions generally may not be admitted against the individual for
sentencing purposes unless the defendant was advised of the right against selfincrimination and waived those rights. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469; State v. Jockumsen,
148 Idaho 817,820, (Ct. App. 2010). There is no record in this case that Mr. Velasco
waived his Fifth Amendment rights. The district court therefore erred in considering this
information at sentencing. This case should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing
where the court does not use the information contained the evaluations against
7

Mr. Velasco, and the references to the competency evaluations in the psychosexual
evaluation should be stricken. See Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 823 n.3.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Velasco respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district
court for a new sentencing hearing with instructions that the district court not consider
information obtained from the competency evaluations against Mr. Velasco.
DATED this

th day of June, 2012.
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